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Abstract
An accidental leakage of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) can occur during processes of 
production, storage and transportation. LNG has a complex dispersion characteristic after 
release into the atmosphere. This complex behaviour demands a detailed description of the 
scientific phenomena involved in the dispersion of the released LNG. Moreover, a fugitive 
LNG leakage may remain undetected in complex geometry usually in semi-confined or 
confined areas and is prone to fire and explosion events. To identify location of potential fire 
and/or explosion events, resulting from accidental leakage and dispersion of LNG, a dispersion 
modelling of leakage is essential. This study proposes a methodology comprising of release 
scenarios, credible leak size, simulation, comparison of congestion level and mass of 
flammable vapour for modelling the dispersion of a small leakage of LNG and its vapour in a 
typical layout using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) approach. The methodology is 
applied to a case study considering a small leakage of LNG in three levels of equipment 
congestion. The potential fire and/or explosion hazard of small leaks is assessed considering 
both time dependent concentration analysis and area-based model. Mass of flammable vapour 
is estimated in each case and effect of equipment congestion on source terms and dispersion 
characteristics are analysed. The result demonstrates that the small leak of LNG can create 
hazardous scenarios for a fire and/or explosion event. It is also revealed that higher degree of 
equipment congestion increases the retention time of vapour and intensifies the formation of 
pockets of isolated vapour cloud. This study would help in designing appropriate leak and 
dispersion detection systems, effective monitoring procedures and risk assessment.
Keywords: Complex layout, LNG, fugitive leakage, dispersion modelling, CFD, FLACS
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1. Introduction
High demand for the consumption of natural gas, (LNG), means an outstanding increase in 
production, storage and transportation of natural gas [1]. Hence, the potential hazards of LNG 
spills and the associated impacts on the exposed population and environment is of major 
concern [2]. To assess potential risk of LNG spills and the consequences, it is vital to study 
LNG vapour dispersion behaviour. After the leakage, LNG hazards can be evaluated in three 
stages: source term (pool development and its evaporation); dispersion; and effects (due to fire 
thermal radiation and/or explosion overpressure) [3]. To identify and assess the risks of LNG 
release, hazards of each phase need to be considered. Being 1.5 times heavier than air, after 
release into the atmosphere, the dispersion of LNG occurs in three phases: negative buoyancy 
dominated; stably stratified; and passive dispersion [4]. The dispersion of LNG mainly depends 
on the evaporation rate of LNG pool and atmospheric effect. The LNG vapour initially released 
from spill is denser than the air and forms a vapour cloud around the release location close to 
the ground. The buoyancy is not dominant at this stage and the vapour disperses into the 
surrounds due to the wind. The atmospheric condition also matters at this phase by warming 
the vapour due to conduction when it is diluted in the surrounding environment [5]. This causes 
instantaneous vaporisation of LNG due to its cryogenic nature which leads to the formation of 
a flammable vapour cloud [6]. Considering its complex dispersion behaviour, a detailed 
understanding of spilled LNG behaviour is required for the accurate prediction of potential 
consequences.
An accidental LNG release and its dispersion may cause severe consequences such as structural 
failure due to brittle fracture, asphyxiation, and fire and explosion. Dispersion of combustion 
products released after LNG vapour fire and explosion also presents a serious hazard to humans 
and the surrounding structures [7]. These events may lead to fatalities and financial losses. Past 
LNG accidents are reported in Woodward and Pitblado [5]. For example, fire and explosion 
occurred in a LNG facility in Skikda, Algeria on 19 January 2004 which resulted in 27 
casualties, 56 injuries and $900 million loss [8]. Either LNG or refrigerant leakage from a 
defective pipe used to transport LNG and hydrocarbon products in liquid state was identified 
as a primary cause of the fire and explosion event [8]. The release rate was about 10 kg/s [9]. 
More recently, on 3 March 2014, the Plymouth-Liquefied Natural Gas Peak Shaving Plant 
experienced a catastrophic failure which resulted in an explosion in a portion of the facility’s 
LNG-1 purification and regeneration system [10]. The investigation report [10] found that the 
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primary cause of this accident was operator error which led to vessel and piping failure from 
detonation caused by internal auto-ignition due to a purge that failed to remove a gas air mixture 
from the system. The incident injured 5 employees and cost $45,749,300. This shows that 
formation of a flammable vapour cloud after the release of LNG is a major issue. The wide 
flammability range of natural gas makes its dispersion behaviour a critical priority to be fully 
understood. If an ignition source is present and the vapour air mixture is in its flammable range, 
the vapour cloud will ignite and catastrophic consequences are likely [11]. The US Federal 
Regulation 49 CFR Part 193.2059 [12] and standard NFPA 59A [13] require the use of 
validated consequence models to predict potential hazardous areas adjacent to LNG facilities 
in the event of an accidental LNG spill [14]. For quantitative risk assessment of an accidental 
LNG spill, no sufficient data are available to calculate LNG leak frequency in LNG production 
and receiving facilities. To avoid this limitation, Kim, Koh, Kim and Theofanous [15] provided 
the top events of major LNG releases from membrane type LNG storage tanks and associated 
pipes considering release scenarios of overfilling, over-pressurisation, under-pressurisation, 
failure of inlet lines and outlet lines and loss of mechanical integrity of the tank using Fault 
Tree analysis. Based on these failure mechanisms, total leak frequency was found to be 5.2 
×10-5 per year. However, this may not be adequate for risk assessment and management of a 
large and complex facility with liquefaction and offloading processes.
Some large scale experiments and tests were carried out to gain an understanding of spill and 
dispersion characteristics of LNG such as the Burro series [16], Coyote series [17], Falcon 
series [18], Maplin Sands tests [19], Esso tests [20], Shell jettison tests [21], Avocet [22], and 
Brayton Fire Training Field (BFTF) [23]. Due to the difficulties, costs, and risks involved in 
conducting such experiments, computational modelling of LNG spill and dispersion is strongly 
favoured [24]. To model LNG vapour dispersion, there are various approaches with different 
levels of complexity are available, i.e. simple empirical models, integral, shallow-layer models 
and fully three-dimensional CFD models [25]. The use of CFD codes for LNG vapour cloud 
dispersion simulation is strongly recommended by the Sandia National Laboratories 2004 
report [26]. CFD modelling allows for the representation of complex geometry and its effects 
on flow and dispersion [23, 27]. According to Cormier, Qi, Yun, Zhang and Mannan [23] four 
publicly available CFD codes are widely used for LNG dispersion modelling namely FEM3 
[28], Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) [29], ANSYS Fluent [27] and ANSYS CFX [14, 
30]. Moreover, Open Field Operation and Manipulation (OpenFoam) [31] and Fire Dynamics 
Simulator (FDS) have also been used for LNG dispersion modelling [32].
4
Past LNG dispersion modellings were studied based on spill into impoundment [27, 33], over 
water [26, 34, 35], trenches [32, 36] and terrain [37]. These studies were performed 
incorporating large leaks of gas or LNG vapour. The large-scale field tests for LNG dispersion 
are summarised in Table 1. 










































































































The US Department of Energy Report 2012 [40] considered 0.005 m2 (80 mm diameter) as a 
very small breach size in studying the impact of LNG spill. According to Fitzgerald [41] the 
oil and gas industry has generally adopted the 2 inch (50.8 mm) maximum leak size for Facility 
Siting Studies (FSSs) and guidance relevant to leak size also tends to agree in either limiting 
leaks to a maximum diameter of 2 inches or uses a portion of the pipe cross-section as their 
assumed leak size. This has been considered as the accepted level of conservatism in most 
facilities. This shows that these leaks sizes, or smaller, are often not considered in risk analysis 
and their prevention or control strategies are not emphasised. However, typically smaller leaks 
(10-25 mm) are highly likely to occur in the LNG facility’s lifetime [5]. A fugitive leakage 
often represents only a small source of leaks and seems to be inconsequential. However, if the 
leaked fuel is exposed to an ignition source within its flammable range, it will cause various 
transitional events in congested layout leading to catastrophic consequences. According to an 
HSE report [42], more than 50% of the total hydrocarbons (HCs) release incidents are minor 
ones (Table 2). On the other hand, an accumulation of several fugitive leakages from any source, 
or group of sources, creates a major release into the air which is equivalent to a large release. 
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Given the high frequency of small leaks and the high potential to trigger major accidents, 
smaller leak and its dispersion may be too simplistic to ignore. Despite the high frequency of 
small leaks and potential for major accidents, dispersion of gas or LNG leaked from small leak 
sizes (smaller than or equal to 2-inch) has not been emphasised considering the effect of 
congestion levels on source terms and LNG vapour dispersion. According to Paris [45] the 
strength of a gas explosion depends on various variables such as congestion, fuel types, 
flammable cloud size, shape and ignition location and strength. Equipment congestion plays a 
critical role in the gas dispersion and explosion [46, 47]. Because equipment congestion 
changes Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) distance and concentration level [23]. According to 
the Yellow Book [48] the percentage of the vapour cloud varies, depending on different factors, 
including the type and amount of the material released, pressure at release, size of release 
opening, degree of confinement of the cloud, and wind, humidity and other environmental 
effects. The equipment congestion, obstacle and roughness of the surface affect source term 
parameters and dispersion behaviour. Cormier, Qi, Yun, Zhang and Mannan [23] claimed that 
wind velocity, obstacles, sensible heat flux, and the released mass affect LFL distance and 
vapour concentration level. Thus, this study considers the effects of equipment congestion  on 
source terms, namely pool evaporation rate, pool area and evaporation rate per area for 
spreading pool on a steel plate.












2007 185 110 59.46
2008 147 93 63.27
2009 179 95 53.07
2010 186 109 58.60
2011 142 82 57.75
2012 105 58 55.24
2013 118 70 59.32
2014 94 47 50
2015 93 50 53.76
2016 104 55 52.88
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Modelling of gas dispersion in an offshore facility is generally difficult due to complex 
geometries and layouts. Contrary to conventional offshore facilities, a floating LNG (FLNG) 
processing facility is expected to have higher risks of vapour cloud dispersion, fire and 
explosion due to processing, storage and offloading of LNG and other flammable products in 
harsh environmental conditions [49]. It is stated by Cataylo and Tanigawa [50] that leaks occur 
across LNG facilities. Li, Ma, Abdel-jawad and Huang [51] investigated the effect of safety 
gap on dispersion of gas releases in FLNG platform and claimed that the safety gap reduces 
the gas cloud size between adjacent modules. But these studies [51, 52] investigated the LNG 
dispersion phenomena considering large leak size which is a rare event. Small leaks occur 
frequently, which can be too simple to ignore in a complex layout due to resulting volume of 
LNG under ambient conditions and potential to cause serious events. Because of these, there 
is a need for modelling  small leak and dispersion characteristics of LNG in FLNG processing 
facility for risk assessment and management. The current study aims at investigating small leak 
and dispersion behaviour of LNG in a typical FLNG processing facility by considering effect 
of equipment congestion. The result demonstrates that small leak of LNG can create hazardous 
scenarios for fire and explosion events and reveals that higher degree of equipment congestion 
increases the retention time of vapour and intensifies the formation of pockets of isolated 
vapour cloud. 
2. Release and dispersion modelling
Figure 1 illustrates the developed procedure for the dispersion modelling of small LNG leak in 
a complex geometry. This consists of release scenario development, credibility estimation of 
release scenario, consideration of various degrees of congestion, CFD simulation and 
comparison of flammable vapour profile.
In step 1, possible release scenarios based on potential release cases of LNG are identified. 
This helps to select representative release scenarios which cause the release of hazardous 
material. Due to the large number of release scenarios, it is usual to consider only a few release 
cases to represent the entire range of scenarios. The release scenarios can be developed using 
analytical processes such as hazard identification (HAZID), and Hazard and Operability Study 
(HAZOP). The parameters related to release scenario have been considered in several studies 
(examples [53-57]). Pool shape and spreading depend on surface types, pouring conditions, 
and obstacles [56]. Once the LNG pool is formed, the rate at which vapour is produced is 
related mainly to the LNG spilled area and the rate of heat transfer to the liquid. The pool area 
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is highly dependent on the local terrain over which the spill takes place [56]. The presence of 
obstructions such as dyke or bund walls, the roughness of the ground can have a significant 
effect on pool area and shape [56, 57]. The vaporisation rate depends on the thermal 
conductivity of the ground, heat transferred from the air, and take-up rates by the air flow over 
the pool [57]. As LNG vapour dispersion behaviour depends on source terms, all parameters 
associated with an LNG release scenario need to be carefully considered in the dispersion 
modelling [57].
No
1. Development of release scenarios
2. Selection of the most credible leak
    size
4. Dispersion simulation using





5. Mass estimation of flammable gas
3. Consideration of different 
    congestion levels
 
6. Comparison of mass of flammable LNG
    vapour in different congestion levels
Figure 1. Procedure for modelling LNG dispersion using CFD code
In step 2, probable LNG release scenarios are identified according to hazard identification and 
estimation. The past accident analyses [59-61] reveal that most of the catastrophic accidents 
occurred due to ignorance (the accident was unforeseen) and inadequate control arrangements. 
Thus, it is essential to adequately assess any potential threats/hazards in all areas of a facility 
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foreseeing accident scenario to ensure effectiveness of control measures or emergency plans. 
The credibility of occurrence facilitates the identification of worse case scenarios and 
application of effective countermeasures. In a complex processing facility, there can be 
hundreds of potential release or leak scenarios, hence randomly selecting a few scenarios for 
modelling is neither appropriate nor reasonable. This makes the credibility estimation an 
efficient method to identify the most credible scenarios. A credible scenario is one with high 
probability of occurrence and high damage potential. The damage potential of each scenario is 
calculated based on hazard identification and assessment. For hazard identification and 
assessment during release of LNG, several approaches are used, i.e. worst case approaches, 
maximum credible event approaches and risk assessment approaches [62]. Pitblado, Baik, 
Hughes, Ferro and Shaw [63]  have identified several maximum credible events including;
a. Maximum credible puncture hole = 0.25 m,
b. Maximum credible hole from accidental operation events = 0.75 m,
c. Maximum credible hole from terrorist events = 1.5 m (1.7 m2),
d. Maximum credible operational spillage events (10 minutes) = 7,000 m3/hr, and
e. Maximum credible sabotage event (60 minutes) = 10,000 m3/hr.
In step 3, various parameters that directly affect dispersion simulation are identified and 
defined. In semi-confined areas, gas dispersion depends on several factors such as wind speed 
and its direction, equipment congestion, mass flow rate and atmospheric conditions. In several 
literatures [23, 64, 65], the impact of wind speed and its direction, mass flow rate and 
atmospheric conditions are commonly included. However, the impact of congestion level on 
dispersion of fugitive gases has not received much attention. Equipment arrangement or 
congestion is important in any processing facility that handles flammable or combustible 
materials. Tightly packed equipment increases equipment confinement and congestion and 
affects operations, maintenance, and emergency responses [66]. In such congested areas, an 
ignition source would be likely, as opposed to remote areas [26]. The consequences associated 
with the incidental loss of containment are expected to be less severe in less congested layouts 
than those with higher level of congestion. For instance, larger spaces between equipment 
reduce the fire impact on surroundings by decreasing exposure level and the thermal radiation 
intensity. For explosions, larger gaps between equipment reduce the congestion density which 
enhances the blast decay. These larger gaps decrease the magnitude of the blast waves and the 
potential effects on equipment, buildings and their occupants. In the case of toxic release, 
greater distances help reduce the impact on personnel by increasing diffusion and dilution of 
the toxic gas or vapour [67]. Degree of equipment congestion is often defined based on Area 
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Blockage Ratio (ABR) and Volume Blockage Ratio (VBR) [68]. ABR is defined as the area 
blocked by obstacles in relation to the total cross-sectional area, and the pitch, which is the 
distance between successive obstacles or obstacle rows. VBR is defined as the ratio of the 
volume occupied by congestion elements such as pipes, beams and plates to the volume of the 
portion of the plant under consideration. Kinsella [69] defined congestion as the fractional area 
in the path of the flame front occupied by equipment, piping, fittings and other structures such 
as buildings and supporting columns. If congestion is more than the threshold of 30%, it is 
considered ‘high’ for an offshore oil and gas facility [70]. Baker, Tang, Scheier and Silva [71] 
have suggested the following definitions of degree of congestion:
 Low congestion: ABR <10%, obstacles widely spaced, <3 layers of obstacles
 High congestion: ABR > 40%, obstacles fairly closely spaced, ≥3 layers of obstacles
 Medium congestion: Between low and high
In step 4, CFD simulation of the most credible leakage and dispersion scenario is performed 
considering plausible environmental conditions. The CFD model helps to determine the 
dispersion of the LNG vapour cloud in response to wind-vapour interaction, including heat 
transfer from the air and ground to the vapour cloud. This can inherently account for the effects 
of complex geometries, layouts and equipment, and also can assess the effect of vapour barriers 
on cloud dispersion [36].  For CFD simulation in the current study, FLACS software is used. 
FLACS has been the leading tool for explosion consequence prediction in petrochemical 
installations for more than a decade and it is approved for LNG Vapour Dispersion Modelling 
under US Federal Regulations (49 CFR 193.2059) [72]. Using a finite volume method, FLACS 
solves the conservations of mass, momentum, enthalpy, and mass fraction of species, closed 








∂𝑥𝑗(𝜌𝛤∅ ∂∂𝑥𝑗(∅)) = 𝑆∅                                       
Where t, ρ, u and  represent time, density, velocity and general variable.∅
FLACS has been extensively validated against different dispersion experiments including 
Coyote series (3, 5 and 6), Burro tests (3, 7, 8 and 9), Falcon Tests (1, 3 and 4), Maplin Sand 
Test series (27 and 34) and Thorney Island Tests (45 and 47) [74].
In step 5, flammable vapour footprint is estimated using a concentration range of 2.5-15%. 
Estimation of flammable mass of dispersed vapour is needed to estimate fire and explosion 
hazards. In order to cause fire and or explosion, the concentration of LNG vapour should be 
within the flammability range (5 - 15%) [75]. However, for computing safety distance, the U.S. 
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Federal Government regulation 49-CFR-193 (Flammable vapour-gas dispersion protection) 
recommended using 50% of LFL. This recommendation has been done to account for two 
potential effects during vapour dispersion [76]. Firstly, wind may break away pockets of 
flammable vapour from the continuous cloud and they may be carried beyond the continuous 
cloud. Secondly, there is the potential expansion of the area of combustion attributed to 
expanding gases and the high energy release overdriving the flammability limit. Thus, a 
conservative estimate of the downwind flammable distance is considered by assuming that the 
vapour pocket will dissipate when the cloud concentration is below half the LFL. Due to these 
assumptions the resulting cloud coverage length should be considered worst-case possibility 
[76].
In the final step, flammable mass or volume of LNG vapour is estimated against different 
congestion levels and dispersion characteristics of fugitive LNG being assessed. Identification 
of a hazardous region in a facility would help to better understand the requirement of leak 
detection design and monitoring and control measures. It also would help to identify potentially 
safer areas during fugitive leaks at given atmospheric conditions.
3. Application of the modelling procedure (A case study)
The case study and analysis presented in this paper represents a generic solution method for 
simulation of vapour dispersion from an LNG spill in a facility with various degrees of 
equipment congestion. The proposed methodology is applied to a generic layout of a processing 
facility as shown in Figure 2. The model is 160 m long, 60 m wide and 40 m high. Responses 
to leak, vaporisation and dispersion depend on several operating parameters. For illustration 
purposes, only a specific case was presented considering prevalent conditions.
3.1. Development of release scenarios
In an FLNG processing facility, LNG is present in liquefaction module, storage tanks, 
offloading system and their connecting pipes. As the main objective of this study is to assess 
the dispersion phenomenon of fugitive leakage of LNG, a typical small leakage under 
operational conditions is considered. In chemical processes, fugitive emissions result from 
equipment leaks, solvent transfers, filter changes, and spills [44].
11
Figure 2. A typical FLNG processing facility
For dispersion modelling, the most congested module is considered as shown in Figure 3 with 
the dimensions of 60 m × 45 m × 5 m. This layout is the lowest deck of a module which includes 
a greater amount of processing equipment than other modules. To assess impact of equipment 
congestion during LNG dispersion, three different layouts of equipment are considered as 
illustrated in Figure 3. In this study, the equipment layout of the three congestions are derived 
considering a strategy to reduce vapour turbulence. LNG vapour dispersion depends on source 
terms (examples: leak rate, pool area and evaporation rate) [57]. The detailed study of source 
terms is beyond the purpose of the study. However,  in this study source terms are incorporated 




Figure 3. Equipment layout in the three congestions based on VBR; (a) 22%, (b) 18% and (c) 
14%.
3.2. Selection of credible leak size
In a complex processing facility, there can be several potential LNG release scenarios [77]. 
Generally, in such large facilities, non-hazardous areas are ignored or not given due attention 
for risk assessment and mitigation because few or no accidents have been reported in such areas. 
In such situations, even a small leak may lead to a catastrophic accident. There is no universal 
consensus regarding the credible fugitive leak size. The maximum credible event (leak 
size/hole) proposed/identified by Pitblado, Baik, Hughes, Ferro and Shaw [63] contradicts 
Woodward and Pitblado [5] which stated that smaller leak size of 10-25 mm are highly likely 
to occur in an LNG plant lifetime. However, it has been found that 2 inch (50.8 mm) leak size 
is adopted as the maximum permissible leak in oil and gas industry in determining maximum 
credible events for Facility Siting Studies [41]. This study aims to assess dispersion behaviour 
of LNG using permissible leak size to investigate potential hazards for fire and explosion. In 
  (b)
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this study, LNG leak from a puncture hole of 25 mm is considered as the maximum credible 
size which is 50% less than the maximum permissible leak. Additionally, after release, LNG 
shows different phenomena of vaporisation and dispersion than that of natural gas due to rapid 
phase change and volume. This signifies the need to study small leakage of LNG. 
    
3.3. Degree of congestion level
Degree of equipment congestion is a pivotal part of safety management [66]. The volumetric 
congestions calculated in the three layouts are presented in Table 3. The first column shows 
the equipment number according to Figure 3 (a). Equipment congestion along the flow front of 
the vapour is used to determine its effect on dispersion. Columns 2, 3 and 4 represent VBR in 
cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. To compare the potential impact of small emission of LNG in 
different levels of equipment congestion and confinement, three levels of equipment 
congestion are considered: 22%, 18% and 14%. Dispersion characteristic of small leakage of 
LNG is assessed based on the mass or volume of combustible vapour in each layout. 
Table 3. Calculation of equipment congestion in the three layouts.
Equipment Case 1 (m3) Case 2 (m3) Case 3 (m3)
1 90 90 90
2 90 90 90
3 108 108 -
4 21.20 21.20 21.20
5 38.47 38.47 -
6 108 108 108
7 90 90 90
8 90 - -
9 108 - -
10 108 108 108
11 135 135 135
12 135 135 -
13 28.26 28.26 28.26
14 50.24 50.24 50.24
15 126 126 126
16 28.26 28.26 -
17 43.96 43.96 43.96
18 240 - -
19 180 180 180
20 192 192 192
21 144 144 144
22 144 144 144
14
23 23.84 23.84 23.84
24 30 30 30
Total volume 2352.22 1914.22 1514.50
Congestion levels 
based on VBR 22% 18% 14%
3.4. Dispersion simulation using FLACS
Dispersion of LNG vapour is greatly influenced by local atmospheric conditions, wind speed, 
atmospheric stability, and ground roughness. For an accurate dispersion simulation using CFD 
code, a precise representation of boundary conditions, initial conditions and atmospheric 
parameters are important. It is assumed that the gas cloud releases instantaneously and 
disperses under ambient atmospheric conditions considering the presence of the obstacles. 
Defining boundary conditions is a key player in an accurate CFD simulation [78]. According 
to Luketa-Hanlin, Koopman and Ermak [79], seven boundary conditions are required for an 
LNG simulation: inlet, outlet, top, two sides, bottom, and LNG pool. In all three layouts, the 
same boundary and initial conditions are used. The lower boundary in x-axis, the upper 
boundary in y-axis and upper boundary in z-axis are assigned as wind (inflow or parallel 
boundaries). The appropriate wind speed for flammable cloud dispersion is usually close to 2 
to 4 m/s [68]. Thus, wind speed is considered as 3 m/s diagonally in the direction of 225 ° to 
allow for maximum interaction of the dispersed gas with equipment. The reference height of 
the wind is considered as 2 m. In these boundaries, relative turbulence intensity and turbulence 
length scale are assigned as 0.1 and 0.014 m respectively, based on recommendation given in 
FLACS user manual [73]. The remaining boundaries, except the bottom boundary, are 
considered as nozzle at the outflow). The outlet boundaries are kept sufficiently far from the 
potential natural gas cloud build up location to avoid their effects on dispersion phenomena. 
Initial conditions assigned for the simulation are provided in Table 4. To reduce uncertainty in 
this study, value of sensitive parameters such as wind speed, atmospheric stability and release 
rate have been chosen according to past studies [23, 80-82].
Table 4. Initial conditions used for the current study
Parameters Values
Characteristic velocity 3 m/s
Relative turbulence intensity 0.1
Turbulence length scale 0.014 m
15
Temperature 20 °C
Ambient pressure 100 kPa
Ground roughness 0.01 m
Reference height 2 m
Pascal class F
It is assumed that the LNG vapour consists of 92% methane, 7% ethane and 1% propane [73]. 
Release scenario depends on various parameters, i.e. leakage velocity, leaked size and type of 
surface. The leakage parameters are given in Table 5. It is assumed that a leak commences after 
10 s so that the wind field can reach steady state before the occurrence of the leakage. A 
constant mass flow rate of 3 kg/s is considered with an effective leak diameter of 0.025 m based 
on small leak characteristic [5, 83]. In each simulation, the maximum simulation time is 
considered as 120 s and the leak stops at 80 s. The release duration and the simulation time has 
been selected considering Emergency Shutdown (ESD) response time and response time of gas 
detectors. This duration is confirmed by offshore personnel. These values are also similar to  
those reported in the literature [84, 85]. According to Napier and Roopchand [86], release 
duration from dock manifold area (nozzle/line discharge rate) failure is 1.5 minutes. Based on 
this, the release duration has been chosen. The focus of the case study was to primarily 
demonstrate the various steps of the release and dispersion modelling approach. However, this 
duration can be changed to any field scenario.
Table 5. Leak parameters
Leak type Jet
Leak position (25.57, 16, 1)
Leak direction -X




b. Mass flow rate
c. Relative turbulence intensity








Steel plate with thickness of 0.01905 m
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The simulation volume is considered as 47 m × 62 m × 5 m with maximum grid size of 1 m in 
all directions. Around the leak location, the grid resolution is adjusted to 0.01 m in x, y and z 
directions while at the locations far from this area, grids were stretched. The total number of 
control volumes during the dispersion simulation is 319,200. Setting up the required parameters, 
the FLACS solver (dispersion and ventilation module) was used to run the simulation. To make 
the simulation results grid independent, sensitivity analysis was conducted by comparing gas 
concentrations at a monitoring point using the technique advised by GexCon AS [73]. 
3.5. Estimating mass of flammable LNG vapour 
The total mass of the released LNG is 240 kg which is the same in all simulations. However, 
this value does not represent the actual mass of flammable vapour as an entire mass of released 
LNG is not within the flammable range. All released mass of LNG does not remain in 
flammable concentration. The fraction of the released mass within the flammable range is 
estimated using a utility program of FLACS post processing result. The maximum vapours 
with 2.5-15% concentration obtained in the three simulations at 2.3 m above the ground are 
illustrated in Figures 4-6. Under the given conditions, volume and mass of flammable vapour 
dispersed (available) in the three layouts are estimated using post processing results of 
simulation as shown in Table 6. The flammable mass is the mass of the fuel when the ratio 
((fuel mass)/(fuel and air mass)) is within the flammable range (2.5-15%). Thus, the flammable 
volume consists of the mixture of fuel and air. The likelihood of vapour ignition outside the 
given range at the given time is considered negligible.
Table 6. Mass and volume of flammable vapour in the three layouts






Maximum flammable mass of vapour (kg) 9.53 3.52 2.05
Maximum flammable volume of vapour (m3) 218 84 45
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(a)                                                                                              (b)                                                
Figure 4. Footprints of flammable vapour (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above the ground in Case 1 (a) 2D 
and (b) 3D at 90 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the flammable 
vapour in the layout.
(b)                                                                                       (b)                                               
Figure 5. Footprints of flammable vapour (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above the ground in Case 2 (a) 2D 
and (b) 3D at 90 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the flammable 
vapour in the layout.
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(a)                                                                                      (b)                                         
Figure 6. Footprints of flammable vapour (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above the ground in Case 3 (a) 2D 
and (b) 3D at 90 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the flammable 
vapour in the layout.
4. Results and discussion
The most important parameter for dispersion is the footprint of flammable vapour in the air 
within the layout. To be ignited, the fuel vapour formed through the dispersion should be in the 
flammable range. The vapour mixture has a LFL of 0.05 and an Upper Flammability Limit 
(UFL) of 0.15. Considering the safety margin, advised by the US Federal Regulation  49 CFR 
Part 193.2059 [12], the LFL is defined as 0.025. The effect of congestion level on the formation 
of flammable vapour was analysed by monitoring the dispersion characteristics. In each case, 
the areas outside the boundary of the vapour are non-hazardous at that time because in those 
areas LNG vapour is not in the flammable range. In this study, the potential fire and/or 
explosion hazard of small LNG leak is assessed considering both time dependent concentration 
analysis and area-based model which focused on the maximum damage area because a 
flammable cloud takes some time to develop before reaching its maximum value and the 
ignition can occur anytime and anywhere after the release. Hence, a given leak can lead to 
several explosion or fire scenarios depending on the cloud size at the time of the delayed 
ignition. Thus, this study considered interactions between congested regions and drifting 
clouds or gas cloud built-up from pool evaporation. A concentration plot at any given location 
as a function of time is helpful to determine the need of safety measures such as forced 
ventilation or vapour barrier and to analyse subsequent fire and/or explosion hazards.
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4.1. Case 1
The first level of congestion considered in the current study is 22%. The LNG vapour tends to 
slump in the congested layout due to low air movement, after vaporisation of LNG as 
demonstrated in Figure 7. The exact location of the leak is marked with red circle in Figure 7 
(ii), which is same in Figures 8 and 9. The maximum flammable mass and volume are 9.53 kg 
and 218 m3, respectively at 40 s. The presence of an obstacle in the centre of the flow path 
diverted the flow front and pockets of vapour accumulated around equipment. In addition to 
this, the presence of obstacles in the flow path diverted the flow and vapour was distributed in 
the spaces between obstacles. This allowed the vapour to remain in the layout for a longer time 
which increased the cloud size. The LNG vapour dispersed according to wind direction and 
entrained around obstacles leading to formation of pockets of vapour concentration in isolated 
locations. The leak stopped at 80 s and the hazardous vapour remained in the layout until 120 
s as shown in Figure 7. This increased the retention time and the likelihood of ignition of 
flammable hazard. This also points out how important it is to consider the appropriate 
flammable range in a safety design of such processing plants. One may only consider the 
regular value of 5% which shows a safer layout according to the dispersion results. However, 
in considering the LFL value recommended by the US Federal Regulation [12], it reveals that 
the layout is not safe after the release of LNG. If an ignition occurs within 110 s, the vapour 
could be ignited with catastrophic consequences, i.e. flash fire in the case of immediate ignition 
or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) in the case of delayed ignition. This implies that the 22% 
level of equipment congestion cannot be considered as a safe level.
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                              (ii)
Leak 
location
Figure 7. Dispersion of LNG vapour in flammable volume concentration (m3/m3) at 2.3 m 
above the ground in Case 1 at (i) 110 s and (ii) 120 s. The concentration range is selected to 
assess the presence of the flammable vapour in the layout.
4.2. Case 2
In Case 2, the volumetric congestion is 18%. The flow paths and vapour size at 100 s is shown 
in Figure 8. The number of obstacles with larger influence in flow diversion in the middle of 
the flow was reduced. This reduced obstruction in the flow path of the cloud. As a result, the 
pockets of vapour were not formed, and the vapour path was simply diverted in two directions. 
The flammable vapour disappeared at 110 s. Although the dispersion analysis shows an 
(i)
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improvement in the safety level of the layout with 18% congestion, in this case the ignition of 
the vapour and flash fire is still a likely scenario.
Figure 8. Dispersion of LNG vapour in flammable volume concentration (m3/m3) at 2.3 m 
above the ground in Case 2 at 100 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence 
of the flammable vapour in the layout.
4.3. Case 3
In this layout, three more pieces of equipment were eliminated from the nearby flow front and 
14% volumetric equipment congestion is obtained. The maximum vapour cloud footprint is 
observed at 78 s. The absence of an obstacle immediate to the leakage area in the flow path 
resulted in undiverted flow of the vapour as demonstrated in Figure 9. The decrease of 
congestion level facilitated the quick dispersion of vapour leading to the rapid dilution of 
flammable vapour with it disappearing at 100 s.
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Figure 9.  Dispersion of LNG vapour in flammable volume concentration (m3/m3) at 2.3 m 
above the ground in Case 3 at 90 s. The concentration is selected to assess the presence of the 
flammable vapour in the layout.
The flammable mass of LNG vapour in three cases at different times is presented in Figure 10. 
The flammable mass of LNG vapour is estimated using an inbuilt utility program of FLACS 
post processing result. The total mass of flammable material released as a function of time was 
calculated and determined the flammable mass in a vapor cloud by integrating across the 
concentration profiles between two concentration limits, the LFL and the UFL.  It is found that 
under the same conditions, the dispersion characteristics influenced by obstacles have 
significant impact on the existence of flammable mass and volume in the given layout. There 
is no significant reduction in the mass and volume of flammable vapour after 10 s of the 
termination of the leak. In Case 1, flammable vapour remains in the layout until 40 s after the 
leak ceases and in Case 2, it remains 25 s after the termination of the leak. Similarly, in Case 
3, the flammable vapour disappeared after 18 s of the leak stopping. It is confirmed that the 
retention time of vapour drops with the decrease in congestion level and the formation of 
vapour pockets depends on obstacles in the flow path. The flammable concentration does not 
disappear promptly after stoppage of the leak; however, it gradually decreases within different 
time ranges which depend on the equipment congestion level. The isolated pockets of LNG 
vapour formation can remain undetected for certain time intervals. This suggests that in any 
typical congested or semi-confined areas, such accumulation may exist for a significant time 
even if the leak ceases. 
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Figure 10. The flammable mass of LNG vapour in three cases at different times
Changing the congestion level, even by a small percentage and change of layout, can produce 
different vapour flow front and vapour cloud shape under the same environmental conditions. 
Furthermore, it is observed that mass and volume of flammable vapour in a layout depend on 
equipment congestion during the fugitive leakage of LNG. The presence of vapour at any 
instant of time decreases with reduction of congestion level as illustrated in Figure 10. This is 
due to the combined effects of the increased effective contact area and heat transfer rate, and 
higher vapour dissipation rate than that of high congestion level [57]. For illustration purposes, 
source terms such as a pool evaporation rate per area, pool area and pool mass for spreading 
pool on a steel plate are plotted and compared as given in Figures 11-13. These illustrations 
show that equipment congestion can affect these parameters and subsequently the dispersion 
behaviour. However, under these considered scenarios, a clear correlation was not obtained 
due to the lack of uniform variations. As illustrated in Figures 11-13, the time dependent plots 
in different congestion levels were not same under the same input parameters. Because of this, 
the effect of equipment congestion and layout on dispersion of LNG seems to be a key factor 
in assessing and modelling potential vapour dispersion hazards. This also signifies a need for 
vapour dispersion control strategies such as vapour barriers that can be employed to mitigate 
potential vapour dispersion hazards in the event of an LNG spill around the safety critical areas. 
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Figure 11. A comparison of evaporation rate per area of the LNG pool in three cases.
Often fugitive gas dispersion is neglected assuming that a fugitive gas leak has no potential to 
cause major accidents and it is difficult to assess its direct impact [87]. It may have no impact, 
or its impact can be insignificant if the released gas does not ignite or ignites without 
propagating and transitioning to other events such as explosion event. However, there are many 
instances where fugitive leaks, dispersions and ignitions have caused catastrophic fire and 
explosion [88]. It is agreed that heat radiation from the ignition of such a small quantity of gas 
may not cause direct asset damage, but, has the potential to trigger secondary or tertiary events 
thereby causing domino effects (chain of accidents). One example of small leak and major 
accident is the Skikda LNG accident which was initially caused by small leak which ignited 
and resulted in the first small explosion [8]. This explosion breached the boiler and provided 
an ignition source to the external accumulation of combustible gas leading to the larger 
explosion. 
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Figure 12. A comparison of pool area in three cases.
Besides, fire and explosion hazard, LNG vapour has potential for asphyxiation hazard during 
an accidental release of LNG. Integration of an asphyxiation hazard analysis with dispersion 
modelling would help to identify potential impact to personnel in the facility. According to 
Lipton and Lynch [89], workers frequently exposed to gases from fugitive emissions in 
processing plants. Even though, the quantity of fugitive emissions is very small, prolonged 
exposure may be threatening to health especially if carcinogens are involved. Consideration of 
fugitive emissions from an occupational health viewpoint is essential because each year more 
people die from work-related diseases than are killed in industrial accidents [87]. Therefore, it 
is important to reduce fugitive emissions as low as reasonably practicable to create a healthier, 
safer, more productive workplace as well as improving operating efficiency.
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Figure 13. A comparison of pool mass in three cases
For handling uncertainty of various parameters in dispersion modelling, different techniques 
are available such as Monte Carlo simulation and fuzzy sets theory. In the proposed 
methodology, uncertainties can be handled by using mean value of sensitive parameters 
obtained from past studies [23, 80-82]. Uncertainty analysis in dispersion of gas is well 
discussed in past studies [80-82]. For instance, Siuta, Markowski and Mannan [80] used fuzzy 
sets theory and Monte Carlo simulation for uncertainty analysis to model LNG source terms 
and dispersion models. To reduce uncertainty in dispersion modelling, value of sensitive 
parameters such as wind speed, atmospheric stability and release rate have been chosen 
according to these past studies. Moreover, a grid sensitivity analysis was performed using 
volumetric concentration to obtain grid independence solution. A comprehensive uncertainty 
analysis was beyond the scope of this study as the main purpose of the case study was to show 
the application of the proposed methodology. However, a detailed uncertainty analysis can be 
considered in future work.
5. Conclusions
In any congested and complex layout of processing facilities, a fugitive release of LNG would 
be a major safety concern. A methodology is proposed for modelling a small LNG leak and its 
dispersion. The methodology comprises of release scenarios, credible leak size, simulation, 
comparison of congestion level and mass of flammable vapour. The methodology is applied to 
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a typical layout considering three levels of equipment congestion. The potential fire and/or 
explosion hazard of small LNG leak is assessed considering both time dependent concentration 
analysis and area-based model. The case study demonstrated that even after the termination of 
the leak, the LNG vapour continued to disperse, and the volumetric concentration was still 
within the flammable range. This led to accumulation of pockets of LNG vapours in the spaces 
between equipment. In the higher degree of congestion layout, higher amount of flammable 
mass and volume of LNG vapour was observed. The retention time of the flammable vapour 
in the higher congestion level layout was also more than that in the lower congestion level 
layout under the same operating conditions. Subsequently, this intensifies the formation of 
pockets of isolated vapour cloud. In a congested layout, the accumulation of flammable vapour 
of LNG would remain undetected and could pose fire and explosion hazards. It is therefore too 
conservative to neglect small leak scenario in a complex layout because of the effect of 
equipment congestion on source terms and dispersion behaviour. The case study results 
demonstrated that equipment congestion has effects on both source terms and dispersion of 
LNG vapour. This signifies a need for robust measures for detection and monitoring of such 
releases, including effective prevention and control measures such as ventilation, vapour 
barriers and emergency shutdown systems in a congested LNG processing facility. The study 
also confirmed that in considering 2.5% as lower flammability limit for assessment of hazard 
distance, as recommended by the US 49-CFR-193.2059 regulation, design safety could be 
improved. Furthermore, an asphyxiation hazard, likely to be posed by LNG vapour, would be 
an important aspect of LNG vapour dispersion modelling in future works.
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2. Retention time of LNG vapour increases with increase of congestion levels
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a congested processing facility
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Abstract
An accidental leakage of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) can occur during processes of 
production, storage and transportation. LNG has a complex dispersion characteristic after 
release into the atmosphere. This complex behaviour demands a detailed description of the 
scientific phenomena involved in the dispersion of the released LNG. Moreover, a fugitive 
LNG leakage may remain undetected in complex geometry usually in semi-confined or 
confined areas and is prone to fire and explosion events. To identify location of potential fire 
and/or explosion events, resulting from accidental leakage and dispersion of LNG, a dispersion 
modelling of leakage is essential. This study proposes a methodology comprising of release 
scenarios, credible leak size, simulation, comparison of congestion level and mass of 
flammable vapour for modelling the dispersion of a small leakage of LNG and its vapour in a 
typical layout using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) approach. The methodology is 
applied to a case study considering a small leakage of LNG in three levels of equipment 
congestion. The potential fire and/or explosion hazard of small leaks is assessed considering 
both time dependent concentration analysis and area-based model. Mass of flammable vapour 
is estimated in each case and effect of equipment congestion on source terms and dispersion 
characteristics are analysed. The result demonstrates that the small leak of LNG can create 
hazardous scenarios for a fire and/or explosion event. It is also revealed that higher degree of 
equipment congestion increases the retention time of vapour and intensifies the formation of 
pockets of isolated vapour cloud. This study would help in designing appropriate leak and 
dispersion detection systems, effective monitoring procedures and risk assessment.
Keywords: Complex layout, LNG, fugitive leakage, dispersion modelling, CFD, FLACS
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1. Introduction
High demand for the consumption of natural gas, (LNG), means an outstanding increase 
in production, storage and transportation of natural gas in different forms (Baksh et al., 2017; 
Kumar et al., 2011). Hence, the potential hazards of LNG spills and the associated impacts on 
the exposed population and environment is of major concern (Foss et al., 2003). To assess 
potential risk of LNG spills and the consequences, it is vital to study LNG vapour dispersion 
behaviour. After the leakage, LNG hazards can be evaluated in three stages: source term (pool 
development and its evaporation); dispersion; and effects (due to fire thermal radiation and/or 
explosion overpressure) Lvings et al. (2007). To identify and assess the risks of LNG release, 
hazards of each phase need to be considered. Being 1.5 times heavier than air, after release into 
the atmosphere, the dispersion of LNG occurs in three phases: negative buoyancy dominated; 
stably stratified; and passive dispersion (Sun et al., 2013). The dispersion of LNG mainly 
depends on the evaporation rate of LNG pool and atmospheric effect. The LNG vapour initially 
released from spill is denser than the air and forms a vapour cloud around the release location 
close to the ground. The buoyancy is not dominant at this stage and the vapour disperses into 
the surrounds due to the wind. The atmospheric condition also matters at this phase by warming 
the vapour due to conduction when it is diluted in the surrounding environment (Woodward 
and Pitblado, 2010). This causes instantaneous vaporisation of LNG due to its cryogenic nature 
which leads to the formation of a flammable vapour cloud (Bui et al., 2015). Considering its 
complex dispersion behaviour, a detailed understanding of spilled LNG behaviour is required 
for the accurate prediction of potential consequences.
An accidental LNG release and its dispersion may cause severe consequences such as 
structural failure due to brittle fracture, asphyxiation, and fire and explosion. Dispersion of 
combustion products released after LNG vapour fire and explosion also presents a serious 
hazard to humans and the surrounding structures (Dadashzadeh et al., 2014). These events may 
lead to fatalities and financial losses. Past LNG accidents are reported in Woodward and 
Pitblado (2010). For example, fire and explosion occurred in a LNG facility in Skikda, Algeria 
on 19 January 2004 which resulted in 27 casualties, 56 injuries and $900 million loss (Ouddai 
et al., 2012). Either LNG or refrigerant leakage from a defective pipe used to transport LNG 
and hydrocarbon products in liquid state was identified as a primary cause of the fire and 
explosion event (Ouddai et al., 2012). The release rate was about 10 kg/s (Atkinson et al., 2017). 
More recently, on 3 March 2014, the Plymouth-Liquefied Natural Gas Peak Shaving Plant 
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experienced a catastrophic failure which resulted in an explosion in a portion of the facility’s 
LNG-1 purification and regeneration system (Rukke et al., 2016). The investigation report 
(Rukke et al., 2016) found that the primary cause of this accident was operator error which led 
to vessel and piping failure from detonation caused by internal auto-ignition due to a purge that 
failed to remove a gas air mixture from the system. The incident injured 5 employees and cost 
$45,749,300. This shows that formation of a flammable vapour cloud after the release of LNG 
is a major issue. The wide flammability range of natural gas makes its dispersion behaviour a 
critical priority to be fully understood. If an ignition source is present and the vapour air mixture 
is in its flammable range, the vapour cloud will ignite and catastrophic consequences are likely 
(Alderman, 2005). The US Federal Regulation 49 CFR Part 193.2059 (US Goverment 
Publishing Office (GPO), 1980) and standard NFPA 59A (National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA), 2006) require the use of validated consequence models to predict potential hazardous 
areas adjacent to LNG facilities in the event of an accidental LNG spill (Qi et al., 2010). For 
quantitative risk assessment of an accidental LNG spill, no enough data are available to 
calculate LNG leak frequency in LNG production and receiving facilities. To avoid this 
limitation, Kim et al. (2005) provided the top events of major LNG releases from membrane 
type LNG storage tanks and associated pipes considering release scenarios of overfilling, over-
pressurisation, under-pressurisation, failure of inlet lines and outlet lines and loss of mechanical 
integrity of the tank using Fault Tree analysis. Based on these failure mechanisms, total leak 
frequency was found to be 5.2 ×10-5 per year. However, this may not be adequate for risk 
assessment and management of a large and complex facility with liquefaction and offloading 
processes.
Some large scale experiments and tests were carried out to gain an understanding of spill 
and dispersion characteristics of LNG such as the Burro series (Koopman et al., 1982), Coyote 
series (Goldwire et al., 1983), Falcon series (Brown et al., 1990), Maplin Sands tests 
(Colenbrander et al., 1984), Esso tests (Feldbauer et al., 1972), Shell jettison tests (Kneebone 
and Prew, 1974), Avocet (Koopman et al., 1979), and Brayton Fire Training Field (BFTF) 
(Cormier et al., 2009). Due to the difficulties, costs, and risks involved in conducting such 
experiments, computational modelling of LNG spill and dispersion is strongly favoured 
(Ikealumba and Wu, 2016). To model LNG vapour dispersion, there are various approaches 
with different levels of complexity are available, i.e. simple empirical models, integral, 
shallow-layer models and fully three-dimensional CFD models (Baalisampang et al., 2017b). 
The use of CFD codes for LNG vapour cloud dispersion simulation is strongly recommended 
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by the Sandia National Laboratories 2004 report (Hightower et al., 2004). CFD modelling 
allows for the representation of complex geometry and its effects on flow and dispersion 
(Cormier et al., 2009; Gavelli et al., 2008). According to Cormier et al. (2009) four publicly 
available CFD codes are widely used for LNG dispersion modelling namely FEM3 (Chan, 
1992), Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) (Dharmavaram et al., 2005), ANSYS Fluent 
(Gavelli et al., 2008) and ANSYS CFX (Qi et al., 2010; Sklavounos and Rigas, 2004). 
Moreover, Open Field Operation and Manipulation (OpenFoam) (Fiates et al., 2016) and Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS) have also been used for LNG dispersion modelling (Melton and 
Cornwell, 2010).
Past LNG dispersion modellings were studied based on spill into impoundment (Gavelli 
et al., 2008; Havens and Spicer, 2005), over water (Brandeis and Ermak, 1983; Hightower et 
al., 2004; Hissong, 2007), trenches (Gavelli et al., 2010; Melton and Cornwell, 2010) and 
terrain (Chan and Ermak, 1984). These studies were performed incorporating large leaks of gas 
or LNG vapour. The large-scale field tests for LNG dispersion are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 
















































































































The US Department of Energy Report 2012 (United States Department of Energy, 2012) 
considered 0.005 m2 (80 mm diameter) as a very small breach size in studying the impact of 
LNG spill. According to Fitzgerald (2016) the oil and gas industry has generally adopted the 2 
inch (50.8 mm) maximum leak size for Facility Siting Studies (FSSs) and guidance relevant to 
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leak size also tends to agree in either limiting leaks to a maximum diameter of 2 inches or uses 
a portion of the pipe cross-section as their assumed leak size. This has been considered as the 
accepted level of conservatism in most facilities. This shows that these leaks sizes, or smaller, 
are often not considered in risk analysis and their prevention or control strategies are not 
emphasised. However, typically smaller leaks (10-25 mm) are highly likely to occur in the 
LNG facility’s lifetime (Woodward and Pitblado, 2010). A fugitive leakage often represents 
only a small source of leaks and seems to be inconsequential. However, if the leaked fuel is 
exposed to an ignition source within its flammable range, it will cause various transitional 
events in congested layout leading to catastrophic consequences. According to an Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) report (HSE, 2017), more than 50% of the total hydrocarbons (HCs) 
release incidents are minor ones (Table 2). On the other hand, an accumulation of several 
fugitive leakages from any source, or group of sources, creates a major release into the air 
which is equivalent to a large release. Given the high frequency of small leaks and the high 
potential to trigger major accidents, smaller leak and its dispersion may be too simplistic to 
ignore. Despite the high frequency of small leaks and potential for major accidents, dispersion 
of gas or LNG leaked from small leak sizes (smaller than or equal to 2-inch) has not been 
emphasised considering the effect of congestion levels on source terms and LNG vapour 
dispersion. According to Paris (2019) the strength of a gas explosion depends on various 
variables such as congestion, fuel types, flammable cloud size, shape and ignition location and 
strength. Equipment congestion plays a critical role in the gas dispersion and explosion (Li et 
al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014). Because equipment congestion changes Lower Flammability Limit 
(LFL) distance and concentration level (Cormier et al., 2009). According to the Yellow Book 
(Van Den Bosh and Weterings, 1997) the percentage of the vapour cloud varies, depending on 
different factors, including the type and amount of the material released, pressure at release, 
size of release opening, degree of confinement of the cloud, and wind, humidity and other 
environmental effects. The equipment congestion, obstacle and roughness of the surface affect 
source term parameters and dispersion behaviour. Cormier et al. (2009) claimed that wind 
velocity, obstacles, sensible heat flux, and the released mass affect LFL distance and vapour 
concentration level. Thus, this study considers the effects of equipment congestion on source 
terms, namely pool evaporation rate, pool area and evaporation rate per area for spreading pool 
on a steel plate.
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Table 2











2007 185 110 59.46
2008 147 93 63.27
2009 179 95 53.07
2010 186 109 58.60
2011 142 82 57.75
2012 105 58 55.24
2013 118 70 59.32
2014 94 47 50
2015 93 50 53.76
2016 104 55 52.88
Modelling of gas dispersion in an offshore facility is generally difficult due to complex 
geometries and layouts. Contrary to conventional offshore facilities, a floating LNG (FLNG) 
processing facility is expected to have higher risks of vapour cloud dispersion, fire and 
explosion due to processing, storage and offloading of LNG and other flammable products in 
harsh environmental conditions (Baalisampang et al., 2018). It is stated by Cataylo and 
Tanigawa (2014) that leaks occur across LNG facilities. Li et al. (2016) investigated the effect 
of safety gap on dispersion of gas releases in FLNG platform and claimed that the safety gap 
reduces the gas cloud size between adjacent modules. But these studies (Li et al., 2016; Li et 
al., 2017) investigated the LNG dispersion phenomena considering large leak size which is a 
rare event. Small leaks occur frequently, which can be too simple to ignore in a complex layout 
due to resulting volume of LNG under ambient conditions and potential to cause serious events. 
Because of these, there is a need for modelling small leak and dispersion characteristics of 
LNG in FLNG processing facility for risk assessment and management. The current study aims 
at investigating small leak and dispersion behaviour of LNG in a typical FLNG processing 
facility by considering effect of equipment congestion. The result demonstrates that small leak 
of LNG can create hazardous scenarios for fire and explosion events and reveals that higher 
degree of equipment congestion increases the retention time of vapour and intensifies the 
formation of pockets of isolated vapour cloud. 
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2. Release and dispersion modelling
Fig. 1 illustrates the developed procedure for the dispersion modelling of small LNG leak 
in a complex geometry. This consists of release scenario development, credibility estimation 
of release scenario, consideration of various degrees of congestion, CFD simulation and 
comparison of flammable vapour profile.
In step 1, possible release scenarios based on potential release cases of LNG are identified. 
This helps to select representative release scenarios which cause the release of hazardous 
material. Due to the large number of release scenarios, it is usual to consider only a few release 
cases to represent the entire range of scenarios. The release scenarios can be developed using 
analytical processes such as Hazard Identification (HAZID), and Hazard and Operability Study 
(HAZOP). The parameters related to release scenario have been considered in several studies 
(examples (Brambilla and Manca, 2008; Johnson and Cornwell, 2007; Reid, 1980; Saraf and 
Melhem, 2005; Webber et al., 2010)). Pool shape and spreading depend on surface types, 
pouring conditions, and obstacles (Brambilla and Manca, 2008). Once the LNG pool is formed, 
the rate at which vapour is produced is related mainly to the LNG spilled area and the rate of 
heat transfer to the liquid. The pool area is highly dependent on the local terrain over which the 
spill takes place (Brambilla and Manca, 2008). The presence of obstructions such as dyke or 
bund walls, the roughness of the ground can have a significant effect on pool area and shape 
(Brambilla and Manca, 2008; Webber et al., 2010). The vaporisation rate depends on the 
thermal conductivity of the ground, heat transferred from the air, and take-up rates by the air 
flow over the pool (Webber et al., 2010). As LNG vapour dispersion behaviour depends on 
source terms, all parameters associated with an LNG release scenario need to be carefully 
considered in the dispersion modelling (Webber et al., 2010).
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1. Development of release scenarios
2. Selection of the most credible leak
    size
4. Dispersion simulation using





5. Mass estimation of flammable gas
3. Consideration of different 
    congestion levels
 
6. Comparison of mass of flammable LNG
    vapour in different congestion levels
Fig. 1. Procedure for modelling LNG dispersion using CFD code
In step 2, probable LNG release scenarios are identified according to hazard 
identification and estimation. The past accident analyses (Khan, 2001; Khan and Abbasi, 1999; 
Reddy and Yarrakula, 2016) reveal that most of the catastrophic accidents occurred due to 
ignorance (the accident was unforeseen) and inadequate control arrangements. Thus, it is 
essential to adequately assess any potential threats/hazards in all areas of a facility foreseeing 
accident scenario to ensure effectiveness of control measures or emergency plans. The 
credibility of occurrence facilitates the identification of worse case scenarios and application 
of effective countermeasures. In a complex processing facility, there can be hundreds of 
potential release or leak scenarios, hence randomly selecting a few scenarios for modelling is 
neither appropriate nor reasonable. This makes the credibility estimation an efficient method 
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to identify the most credible scenarios. A credible scenario is one with high probability of 
occurrence and high damage potential. The damage potential of each scenario is calculated 
based on hazard identification and assessment. For hazard identification and assessment during 
release of LNG, several approaches are used, i.e. worst case approaches, maximum credible 
event approaches and risk assessment approaches (Pitblado et al., 2006). Pitblado et al. (2005)  
have identified several maximum credible events including;
a. Maximum credible puncture hole = 0.25 m,
b. Maximum credible hole from accidental operation events = 0.75 m,
c. Maximum credible hole from terrorist events = 1.5 m (1.7 m2),
d. Maximum credible operational spillage events (10 minutes) = 7,000 m3/hr, and
e. Maximum credible sabotage event (60 minutes) = 10,000 m3/hr.
In step 3, various parameters that directly affect dispersion simulation are identified and 
defined. In semi-confined areas, gas dispersion depends on several factors such as wind speed 
and its direction, equipment congestion, mass flow rate and atmospheric conditions. In several 
literatures (Cormier et al., 2009; Kim, 2013; Tauseef et al., 2011), the impact of wind speed 
and its direction, mass flow rate and atmospheric conditions are commonly included. However, 
the impact of congestion level on dispersion of fugitive gases has not received much attention. 
Equipment arrangement or congestion is important in any processing facility that handles 
flammable or combustible materials. Tightly packed equipment increases equipment 
confinement and congestion and affects operations, maintenance, and emergency responses 
(Baalisampang et al., 2016). In such congested areas, an ignition source would be likely, as 
opposed to remote areas (Hightower et al., 2004). The consequences associated with the 
incidental loss of containment are expected to be less severe in less congested layouts than 
those with higher level of congestion. For instance, larger spaces between equipment reduce 
the fire impact on surroundings by decreasing exposure level and the thermal radiation intensity. 
For explosions, larger gaps between equipment reduce the congestion density which enhances 
the blast decay. These larger gaps decrease the magnitude of the blast waves and the potential 
effects on equipment, buildings and their occupants. In the case of toxic release, greater 
distances help reduce the impact on personnel by increasing diffusion and dilution of the toxic 
gas or vapour (Klein and Vaughen, 2017). Degree of equipment congestion is often defined 
based on Area Blockage Ratio (ABR) and Volume Blockage Ratio (VBR) (Woodward, 2010). 
ABR is defined as the area blocked by obstacles in relation to the total cross-sectional area, and 
the pitch, which is the distance between successive obstacles or obstacle rows. VBR is defined 
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as the ratio of the volume occupied by congestion elements such as pipes, beams and plates to 
the volume of the portion of the plant under consideration. Kinsella (1993) defined congestion 
as the fractional area in the path of the flame front occupied by equipment, piping, fittings and 
other structures such as buildings and supporting columns. If congestion is more than the 
threshold of 30%, it is considered ‘high’ for an offshore oil and gas facility (Raman and Grillo, 
2005). Baker et al. (1994) have suggested the following definitions of degree of congestion:
 Low congestion: ABR <10%, obstacles widely spaced, <3 layers of obstacles
 High congestion: ABR > 40%, obstacles fairly closely spaced, ≥3 layers of obstacles
 Medium congestion: Between low and high
In step 4, CFD simulation of the most credible leakage and dispersion scenario is 
performed considering plausible environmental conditions. The CFD model helps to determine 
the dispersion of the LNG vapour cloud in response to wind-vapour interaction, including heat 
transfer from the air and ground to the vapour cloud. This can inherently account for the effects 
of complex geometries, layouts and equipment, and also can assess the effect of vapour barriers 
on cloud dispersion (Gavelli et al., 2010).  For CFD simulation in the current study, FLACS 
software is used. FLACS has been the leading tool for explosion consequence prediction in 
petrochemical installations for more than a decade and it is approved for LNG Vapour 
Dispersion Modelling under US Federal Regulations (49 CFR 193.2059) (Vinnem, 2014). 
Using a finite volume method, FLACS solves the conservations of mass, momentum, enthalpy, 
and mass fraction of species, closed by the ideal gas law represented by the general Equation 








∂𝑥𝑗(𝜌𝛤∅ ∂∂𝑥𝑗(∅)) = 𝑆∅                                       
Where t, ρ, u and  represent time, density, velocity and general variable. FLACS has been ∅
extensively validated against different dispersion experiments including Coyote series (3, 5 
and 6), Burro tests (3, 7, 8 and 9), Falcon Tests (1, 3 and 4), Maplin Sand Test series (27 and 
34) and Thorney Island Tests (45 and 47) (Hansen et al., 2009).
In step 5, flammable vapour footprint is estimated using a concentration range of 2.5-
15%. Estimation of flammable mass of dispersed vapour is needed to estimate fire and 
explosion hazards. In order to cause fire and or explosion, the concentration of LNG vapour 
should be within the flammability range (5 - 15%) (Safitri et al., 2011). However, for 
computing safety distance, the U.S. Federal Government regulation 49-CFR-193 (Flammable 
vapour-gas dispersion protection) recommended using 50% of LFL. This recommendation has 
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been done to account for two potential effects during vapour dispersion (Zinn, 2005). Firstly, 
wind may break away pockets of flammable vapour from the continuous cloud and they may 
be carried beyond the continuous cloud. Secondly, there is the potential expansion of the area 
of combustion attributed to expanding gases and the high energy release overdriving the 
flammability limit. Thus, a conservative estimate of the downwind flammable distance is 
considered by assuming that the vapour pocket will dissipate when the cloud concentration is 
below half the LFL. Due to these assumptions the resulting cloud coverage length should be 
considered worst-case possibility (Zinn, 2005).
In the final step, flammable mass or volume of LNG vapour is estimated against different 
congestion levels and dispersion characteristics of fugitive LNG being assessed. Identification 
of a hazardous region in a facility would help to better understand the requirement of leak 
detection design and monitoring and control measures. It also would help to identify potentially 
safer areas during fugitive leaks at given atmospheric conditions.
3. Application of the modelling procedure (A case study)
The case study and analysis presented in this paper represents a generic solution method 
for simulation of vapour dispersion from an LNG spill in a facility with various degrees of 
equipment congestion. The proposed methodology is applied to a generic layout of a processing 
facility as shown in Fig. 2. The model is 160 m long, 60 m wide and 40 m high. Responses to 
leak, vaporisation and dispersion depend on several operating parameters. For illustration 
purposes, only a specific case was presented considering prevalent conditions.
3.1. Development of release scenarios
In an FLNG processing facility, LNG is present in liquefaction module, storage tanks, 
offloading system and their connecting pipes. As the main objective of this study is to assess 
the dispersion phenomenon of fugitive leakage of LNG, a typical small leakage under 
operational conditions is considered. In chemical processes, fugitive emissions result from 
equipment leaks, solvent transfers, filter changes, and spills (Keoleian et al., 1997).
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Fig. 2. A typical FLNG processing facility
For dispersion modelling, the most congested module is considered as shown in Fig. 3 
with the dimensions of 60 m × 45 m × 5 m. This layout is the lowest deck of a module which 
includes a greater amount of processing equipment than other modules. To assess impact of 
equipment congestion during LNG dispersion, three different layouts of equipment are 
considered as illustrated in Fig. 3. In this study, the equipment layout of the three congestions 
are derived considering a strategy to reduce vapour turbulence. LNG vapour dispersion 
depends on source terms (examples: leak rate, pool area and evaporation rate) (Webber et al., 
2010). The detailed study of source terms is beyond the purpose of the study. However,  in this 
study source terms are incorporated with a careful consideration of the recommendations given 




Fig. 3. Equipment layout in the three congestions based on VBR; (a) 22%, (b) 18% and (c) 
14%.
3.2. Selection of credible leak size
In a complex processing facility, there can be several potential LNG release scenarios 
(Baalisampang et al., 2017a). Generally, in such large facilities, non-hazardous areas are 
ignored or not given due attention for risk assessment and mitigation because few or no 
accidents have been reported in such areas. In such situations, even a small leak may lead to a 
catastrophic accident. There is no universal consensus regarding the credible fugitive leak size. 
The maximum credible event (leak size/hole) proposed/identified by Pitblado et al. (2005) 
contradicts Woodward and Pitblado (2010) which stated that smaller leak size of 10-25 mm 
are highly likely to occur in an LNG plant lifetime. However, it has been found that 2 inch 
(50.8 mm) leak size is adopted as the maximum permissible leak in oil and gas industry in 
determining maximum credible events for Facility Siting Studies (Fitzgerald, 2016). This study 
  (b)
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aims to assess dispersion behaviour of LNG using permissible leak size to investigate potential 
hazards for fire and explosion. In this study, LNG leak from a puncture hole of 25 mm is 
considered as the maximum credible size which is 50% less than the maximum permissible 
leak. Additionally, after release, LNG shows different phenomena of vaporisation and 
dispersion than that of natural gas due to rapid phase change and volume. This signifies the 
need to study small leakage of LNG. 
    
3.3. Degree of congestion level
Degree of equipment congestion is a pivotal part of safety management (Baalisampang 
et al., 2016). The volumetric congestions calculated in the three layouts are presented in Table 
3. The first column shows the equipment number according to Fig. 3 (a). Equipment congestion 
along the flow front of the vapour is used to determine its effect on dispersion. Columns 2, 3 
and 4 represent VBR in cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. To compare the potential impact of small 
emission of LNG in different levels of equipment congestion and confinement, three levels of 
equipment congestion are considered: 22%, 18% and 14%. Dispersion characteristic of small 
leakage of LNG is assessed based on the mass or volume of combustible vapour in each layout. 
Table 3
Calculation of equipment congestion in the three layouts.
Equipment Case 1 (m3) Case 2 (m3) Case 3 (m3)
1 90 90 90
2 90 90 90
3 108 108 -
4 21.20 21.20 21.20
5 38.47 38.47 -
6 108 108 108
7 90 90 90
8 90 - -
9 108 - -
10 108 108 108
11 135 135 135
12 135 135 -
13 28.26 28.26 28.26
14 50.24 50.24 50.24
15 126 126 126
16 28.26 28.26 -
17 43.96 43.96 43.96
18 240 - -
19 180 180 180
15
20 192 192 192
21 144 144 144
22 144 144 144
23 23.84 23.84 23.84
24 30 30 30
Total volume 2352.22 1914.22 1514.50
Congestion levels 
based on VBR 22% 18% 14%
3.4. Dispersion simulation using FLACS
Dispersion of LNG vapour is greatly influenced by local atmospheric conditions, wind 
speed, atmospheric stability, and ground roughness. For an accurate dispersion simulation 
using CFD code, a precise representation of boundary conditions, initial conditions and 
atmospheric parameters are important. It is assumed that the gas cloud releases instantaneously 
and disperses under ambient atmospheric conditions considering the presence of the obstacles. 
Defining boundary conditions is a key player in an accurate CFD simulation (Srebric et al., 
2008). According to Luketa-Hanlin et al. (2007), seven boundary conditions are required for 
an LNG simulation: inlet, outlet, top, two sides, bottom, and LNG pool. In all three layouts, 
the same boundary and initial conditions are used. The lower boundary in x-axis, the upper 
boundary in y-axis and upper boundary in z-axis are assigned as wind (inflow or parallel 
boundaries). The appropriate wind speed for flammable cloud dispersion is usually close to 2 
to 4 m/s (Woodward, 2010). Thus, wind speed is considered as 3 m/s diagonally in the direction 
of 225 ° to allow for maximum interaction of the dispersed gas with equipment. The reference 
height of the wind is considered as 2 m. In these boundaries, relative turbulence intensity and 
turbulence length scale are assigned as 0.1 and 0.014 m respectively, based on recommendation 
given in FLACS user manual (GexCon AS, 2013). The remaining boundaries, except the 
bottom boundary, are considered as nozzle at the outflow). The outlet boundaries are kept 
sufficiently far from the potential natural gas cloud build up location to avoid their effects on 
dispersion phenomena. Initial conditions assigned for the simulation are provided in Table 4. 
To reduce uncertainty in this study, value of sensitive parameters such as wind speed, 
atmospheric stability and release rate have been chosen according to past studies (Cormier et 
al., 2009; Rao, 2005; Siuta et al., 2013; Yegnan et al., 2002).
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Table 4
Initial conditions used for the current study
Parameters Values
Characteristic velocity 3 m/s
Relative turbulence intensity 0.1
Turbulence length scale 0.014 m
Temperature 20 °C
Ambient pressure 100 kPa
Ground roughness 0.01 m
Reference height 2 m
Pascal class F
It is assumed that the LNG vapour consists of 92% methane, 7% ethane and 1% propane 
(GexCon AS, 2013). Release scenario depends on various parameters, i.e. leakage velocity, 
leaked size and type of surface. The leakage parameters are given in Table 5. It is assumed that 
a leak commences after 10 s so that the wind field can reach steady state before the occurrence 
of the leakage. A constant mass flow rate of 3 kg/s is considered with an effective leak diameter 
of 0.025 m based on small leak characteristic (Lee et al., 2015; Woodward and Pitblado, 2010). 
In each simulation, the maximum simulation time is considered as 120 s and the leak stops at 
80 s. The release duration and the simulation time has been selected considering Emergency 
Shutdown (ESD) response time and response time of gas detectors. This duration is confirmed 
by offshore personnel. These values are also similar to  those reported in the literature (Murvay 
and Silea, 2012; Zhang, 1997). According to Napier and Roopchand (1986), release duration 
from dock manifold area (nozzle/line discharge rate) failure is 1.5 minutes. Based on this, the 
release duration has been chosen. The focus of the case study was to primarily demonstrate the 
various steps of the release and dispersion modelling approach. However, this duration can be 
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Steel plate with thickness of 0.01905 m
The simulation volume is considered as 47 m × 62 m × 5 m with maximum grid size of 
1 m in all directions. Around the leak location, the grid resolution is adjusted to 0.01 m in x, y 
and z directions while at the locations far from this area, grids were stretched. The total number 
of control volumes during the dispersion simulation is 319,200. Setting up the required 
parameters, the FLACS solver (dispersion and ventilation module) was used to run the 
simulation. To make the simulation results grid independent, sensitivity analysis was 
conducted by comparing gas concentrations at a monitoring point using the technique advised 
by GexCon AS (2013). 
3.5. Estimating mass of flammable LNG vapour 
The total mass of the released LNG is 240 kg which is the same in all simulations. 
However, this value does not represent the actual mass of flammable vapour as an entire mass 
of released LNG is not within the flammable range. All released mass of LNG does not remain 
in flammable concentration. The fraction of the released mass within the flammable range is 
estimated using a utility program of FLACS post processing result. The maximum vapours 
with 2.5-15% concentration obtained in the three simulations at 2.3 m above the ground are 
illustrated in Figs. 4-6. Under the given conditions, volume and mass of flammable vapour 
dispersed (available) in the three layouts are estimated using post processing results of 
simulation as shown in Table 6. The flammable mass is the mass of the fuel when the ratio 
((fuel mass)/(fuel and air mass)) is within the flammable range (2.5-15%). Thus, the flammable 
volume consists of the mixture of fuel and air. The likelihood of vapour ignition outside the 
given range at the given time is considered negligible.
Table 6
Mass and volume of flammable vapour in the three layouts






Maximum flammable mass of vapour (kg) 9.53 3.52 2.05
Maximum flammable volume of vapour (m3) 218 84 45
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(a)                                                                                              (b)                                                
Fig. 4. Footprints of flammable vapour (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above the ground in Case 1 (a) 2D 
and (b) 3D at 90 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the flammable 
vapour in the layout.
(b)                                                                                       (b)                                               
Fig. 5. Footprints of flammable vapour (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above the ground in Case 2 (a) 2D 
and (b) 3D at 90 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the flammable 
vapour in the layout.
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(a)                                                                                      (b)                                         
Fig. 6. Footprints of flammable vapour (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above the ground in Case 3 (a) 2D 
and (b) 3D at 90 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the flammable 
vapour in the layout.
4. Results and discussion
The most important parameter for dispersion is the footprint of flammable vapour in the 
air within the layout. To be ignited, the fuel vapour formed through the dispersion should be in 
the flammable range. The vapour mixture has an LFL of 0.05 and an Upper Flammability Limit 
(UFL) of 0.15. Considering the safety margin, advised by the US Federal Regulation  49 CFR 
Part 193.2059 (US Goverment Publishing Office (GPO), 1980), the LFL is defined as 0.025. 
The effect of congestion level on the formation of flammable vapour was analysed by 
monitoring the dispersion characteristics. In each case, the areas outside the boundary of the 
vapour are non-hazardous at that time because in those areas LNG vapour is not in the 
flammable range. In this study, the potential fire and/or explosion hazard of small LNG leak is 
assessed considering both time dependent concentration analysis and area-based model which 
focused on the maximum damage area because a flammable cloud takes some time to develop 
before reaching its maximum value and the ignition can occur anytime and anywhere after the 
release. Hence, a given leak can lead to several explosion or fire scenarios depending on the 
cloud size at the time of the delayed ignition. Thus, this study considered interactions between 
congested regions and drifting clouds or gas cloud built-up from pool evaporation. A 
concentration plot at any given location as a function of time is helpful to determine the need 




The first level of congestion considered in the current study is 22%. The LNG vapour 
tends to slump in the congested layout due to low air movement, after vaporisation of LNG as 
demonstrated in Fig. 7. The exact location of the leak is marked with red circle in Fig. 7 (ii), 
which is same in Figs. 8-9. The maximum flammable mass and volume are 9.53 kg and 218 
m3, respectively at 40 s. The presence of an obstacle in the centre of the flow path diverted the 
flow front and pockets of vapour accumulated around equipment. In addition to this, the 
presence of obstacles in the flow path diverted the flow and vapour was distributed in the spaces 
between obstacles. This allowed the vapour to remain in the layout for a longer time which 
increased the cloud size. The LNG vapour dispersed according to wind direction and entrained 
around obstacles leading to formation of pockets of vapour concentration in isolated locations. 
The leak stopped at 80 s and the hazardous vapour remained in the layout until 120 s as shown 
in Fig. 7. This increased the retention time and the likelihood of ignition of flammable hazard. 
This also points out how important it is to consider the appropriate flammable range in a safety 
design of such processing plants. One may only consider the regular value of 5% which shows 
a safer layout according to the dispersion results. However, in considering the LFL value 
recommended by the US Federal Regulation (US Goverment Publishing Office (GPO), 1980), 
it reveals that the layout is not safe after the release of LNG. If an ignition occurs within 110 s, 
the vapour could be ignited with catastrophic consequences, i.e. flash fire in the case of 
immediate ignition or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) in the case of delayed ignition. This 
implies that the 22% level of equipment congestion cannot be considered as a safe level.
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                              (ii)
Leak 
location
Fig. 7. Dispersion of LNG vapour in flammable volume concentration (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above 
the ground in Case 1 at (i) 110 s and (ii) 120 s. The concentration range is selected to assess 
the presence of the flammable vapour in the layout.
4.2. Case 2
In Case 2, the volumetric congestion is 18%. The flow paths and vapour size at 100 s is 
shown in Fig. 8. The number of obstacles with larger influence in flow diversion in the middle 
of the flow was reduced. This reduced obstruction in the flow path of the cloud. As a result, 
the pockets of vapour were not formed, and the vapour path was simply diverted in two 
directions. The flammable vapour disappeared at 110 s. Although the dispersion analysis shows 
(i)
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an improvement in the safety level of the layout with 18% congestion, in this case the ignition 
of the vapour and flash fire is still a likely scenario.
4.3. Case 3
In this layout, three more pieces of equipment were eliminated from the nearby flow front 
and 14% volumetric equipment congestion is obtained. The maximum vapour cloud footprint 
is observed at 78 s. The absence of an obstacle immediate to the leakage area in the flow path 
resulted in undiverted flow of the vapour as demonstrated in Fig. 9. The decrease of congestion 
level facilitated the quick dispersion of vapour leading to the rapid dilution of flammable 
vapour with it disappearing at 100 s.
Fig. 8. Dispersion of LNG vapour in flammable volume concentration (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above 
the ground in Case 2 at 100 s. The concentration range is selected to assess the presence of the 
flammable vapour in the layout.
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The flammable mass of LNG vapour in three cases at different times is presented in Fig. 
10. The flammable mass of LNG vapour is estimated using an inbuilt utility program of FLACS 
post processing result. The total mass of flammable material released as a function of time was 
calculated and determined the flammable mass in a vapor cloud by integrating across the 
concentration profiles between two concentration limits, the LFL and the UFL.  It is found that 
under the same conditions, the dispersion characteristics influenced by obstacles have 
significant impact on the existence of flammable mass and volume in the given layout. There 
is no significant reduction in the mass and volume of flammable vapour after 10 s of the 
termination of the leak. In Case 1, flammable vapour remains in the layout until 40 s after the 
leak ceases and in Case 2, it remains 25 s after the termination of the leak. Similarly, in Case 
3, the flammable vapour disappeared after 18 s of the leak stopping. It is confirmed that the 
retention time of vapour drops with the decrease in congestion level and the formation of 
vapour pockets depends on obstacles in the flow path. The flammable concentration does not 
disappear promptly after stoppage of the leak; however, it gradually decreases within different 
time ranges which depend on the equipment congestion level. The isolated pockets of LNG 
vapour formation can remain undetected for certain time intervals. This suggests that in any 
typical congested or semi-confined areas, such accumulation may exist for a significant time 
even if the leak ceases. 
Fig. 9. Dispersion of LNG vapour in flammable volume concentration (m3/m3) at 2.3 m above 
the ground in Case 3 at 90 s. The concentration is selected to assess the presence of the 
flammable vapour in the layout.
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Fig. 10. The flammable mass of LNG vapour in three cases at different times.
Changing the congestion level, even by a small percentage and change of layout, can 
produce different vapour flow front and vapour cloud shape under the same environmental 
conditions. Furthermore, it is observed that mass and volume of flammable vapour in a layout 
depend on equipment congestion during the fugitive leakage of LNG. The presence of vapour 
at any instant of time decreases with reduction of congestion level as illustrated in Fig. 10. This 
is due to the combined effects of the increased effective contact area and heat transfer rate, and 
higher vapour dissipation rate than that of high congestion level (Webber et al., 2010). For 
illustration purposes, source terms such as a pool evaporation rate per area, pool area and pool 
mass for spreading pool on a steel plate are plotted and compared as given in Figs. 11-13. These 
illustrations show that equipment congestion can affect these parameters and subsequently the 
dispersion behaviour. However, under these considered scenarios, a clear correlation was not 
obtained due to the lack of uniform variations. As illustrated in Figs. 11-13, the time dependent 
plots in different congestion levels were not same under the same input parameters. Because 
of this, the effect of equipment congestion and layout on dispersion of LNG seems to be a key 
factor in assessing and modelling potential vapour dispersion hazards. This also signifies a 
need for vapour dispersion control strategies such as vapour barriers that can be employed to 
mitigate potential vapour dispersion hazards in the event of an LNG spill around the safety 
critical areas. 
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Fig. 11. A comparison of evaporation rate per area of the LNG pool in three cases.
Often fugitive gas dispersion is neglected assuming that a fugitive gas leak has no 
potential to cause major accidents and it is difficult to assess its direct impact (Hassim et al., 
2012). It may have no impact, or its impact can be insignificant if the released gas does not 
ignite or ignites without propagating and transitioning to other events such as explosion event. 
However, there are many instances where fugitive leaks, dispersions and ignitions have caused 
catastrophic fire and explosion. It is agreed that heat radiation from the ignition of such a small 
quantity of gas may not cause direct asset damage, but, has the potential to trigger secondary 
or tertiary events thereby causing domino effects (chain of accidents) (Baalisampang et al., 
2019). One example of small leak and major accident is the Skikda LNG accident which was 
initially caused by small leak which ignited and resulted in the first small explosion (Ouddai et 
al., 2012). This explosion breached the boiler and provided an ignition source to the external 
accumulation of combustible gas leading to the larger explosion. 
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Fig. 12. A comparison of pool area in three cases.
Besides, fire and explosion hazard, LNG vapour has potential for asphyxiation hazard 
during an accidental release of LNG. Integration of an asphyxiation hazard analysis with 
dispersion modelling would help to identify potential impact to personnel in the facility. 
According to Lipton and Lynch (1994), workers frequently exposed to gases from fugitive 
emissions in processing plants. Even though, the quantity of fugitive emissions is very small, 
prolonged exposure may be threatening to health especially if carcinogens are involved. 
Consideration of fugitive emissions from an occupational health viewpoint is essential because 
each year more people die from work-related diseases than are killed in industrial accidents 
(Hassim et al., 2012). Therefore, it is important to reduce fugitive emissions as low as 
reasonably practicable to create a healthier, safer, more productive workplace as well as 
improving operating efficiency.
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Fig. 13. A comparison of pool mass in three cases
For handling uncertainty of various parameters in dispersion modelling, different 
techniques are available such as Monte Carlo simulation and fuzzy sets theory. In the proposed 
methodology, uncertainties can be handled by using mean value of sensitive parameters 
obtained from past studies (Cormier et al., 2009; Rao, 2005; Siuta et al., 2013; Yegnan et al., 
2002). Uncertainty analysis in dispersion of gas is well discussed in past studies (Rao, 2005; 
Siuta et al., 2013; Yegnan et al., 2002). For instance, Siuta et al. (2013) used fuzzy sets theory 
and Monte Carlo simulation for uncertainty analysis to model LNG source terms and dispersion 
models. To reduce uncertainty in dispersion modelling, value of sensitive parameters such as 
wind speed, atmospheric stability and release rate have been chosen according to these past 
studies. Moreover, a grid sensitivity analysis was performed using volumetric concentration to 
obtain grid independence solution. A comprehensive uncertainty analysis was beyond the 
scope of this study as the main purpose of the case study was to show the application of the 
proposed methodology. However, a detailed uncertainty analysis can be considered in future 
work.
5. Conclusions
In any congested and complex layout of processing facilities, a fugitive release of LNG 
would be a major safety concern. A methodology is proposed for modelling a small LNG leak 
and its dispersion. The methodology comprises of release scenarios, credible leak size, 
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simulation, comparison of congestion level and mass of flammable vapour. The methodology 
is applied to a typical layout considering three levels of equipment congestion. The potential 
fire and/or explosion hazard of small LNG leak is assessed considering both time dependent 
concentration analysis and area-based model. The case study demonstrated that even after the 
termination of the leak, the LNG vapour continued to disperse, and the volumetric 
concentration was still within the flammable range. This led to accumulation of pockets of 
LNG vapours in the spaces between equipment. In the higher degree of congestion layout, 
higher amount of flammable mass and volume of LNG vapour was observed. The retention 
time of the flammable vapour in the higher congestion level layout was also more than that in 
the lower congestion level layout under the same operating conditions. Subsequently, this 
intensifies the formation of pockets of isolated vapour cloud. In a congested layout, the 
accumulation of flammable vapour of LNG would remain undetected and could pose fire and 
explosion hazards. It is therefore too conservative to neglect small leak scenario in a complex 
layout because of the effect of equipment congestion on source terms and dispersion behaviour. 
The case study results demonstrated that equipment congestion has effects on both source terms 
and dispersion of LNG vapour. This signifies a need for robust measures for detection and 
monitoring of such releases, including effective prevention and control measures such as 
ventilation, vapour barriers and emergency shutdown systems in a congested LNG processing 
facility. The study also confirmed that in considering 2.5% as lower flammability limit for 
assessment of hazard distance, as recommended by the US 49-CFR-193.2059 regulation, 
design safety could be improved. Furthermore, an asphyxiation hazard, likely to be posed by 
LNG vapour, would be an important aspect of LNG vapour dispersion modelling in future 
works.
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